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Quad9 Is Leaving France: Why DNS Resolvers Are the Wrong Place to Fight Piracy

Quad9 Is Leaving France: Why DNS Resolvers Are the Wrong Place to Fight Piracy

· 21 min read
Technical writer

On Tuesday, November 24, 2026, Quad9 will stop answering DNS queries from France. Quad9 is the Swiss non-profit behind the free 9.9.9.9 resolver, which blocks malware and phishing domains. It is not leaving because of costs or lack of users. It is leaving because a Paris court fined it for refusing to block a list of pirate sports-streaming domains on behalf of beIN Sports. With around 20 similar cases still pending in France, leaving the country is the only option Quad9 can afford.

Cloudflare, which runs the competing 1.1.1.1 resolver, called the departure "a canary in the coal mine", and the post reached the front page of Hacker News. In that thread, Quad9's CTO John Todd asked readers to write "a long-form, well-reasoned statement of why France is taking the wrong path", with plenty of sources, and to send it to policymakers. This is our attempt. Every claim below links to a primary document, a court ruling, or contemporaneous reporting.

What Quad9 is, and why it matters​

A DNS resolver turns a name like example.com into an IP address your computer can connect to. Most people use their ISP's resolver without knowing it. A public resolver is one anyone can point their device or network at instead, such as Google's 8.8.8.8, Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1, Cisco's OpenDNS, or Quad9's 9.9.9.9.

Quad9 has a few properties that make it unusual:

Organisations have come to depend on it. Mullvad shut down its own public encrypted DNS service on November 2, 2026 and moved Mullvad Browser users with default settings to Quad9, funding Quad9 instead. (Mullvad Browser users in France will now be migrated to a resolver that disappears three weeks later.) Quad9's announcement lists dozens of French networks it sees traffic from, including the interministerial digital directorate DINUM, France Travail, CEA, Institut Pasteur, RENATER, EDF, SNCF, AP-HM hospitals in Marseille, France Télévisions, Thales, and Airbus's Stormshield. Quad9 can't tell any of them it is leaving. As Cloudflare points out, when a resolver disappears, users don't see an error message. "Their Internet will simply stop working."

How France got here​

The law: Article L.333-10 of the Code du sport​

The legal basis for all of this is Article L.333-10 of the French sports code. It was created by Law 2021-1382 of October 25, 2021, the same law that merged HADOPI and the CSA into the new regulator Arcom. L.333-10 lets a sports rightsholder go to the president of the Paris judicial court and obtain "dynamic" blocking orders, meaning orders that cover sites already identified plus new mirror domains notified later through Arcom, against "toute personne susceptible de contribuer à y remédier" (any person able to help stop the infringement).

That last phrase is what puts DNS resolvers in scope. In July 2026, Parliament passed Law 2026-725 on professional sport, which amended L.333-10 and added an automated real-time blocking system run by Arcom. TorrentFreak reported that under the new system "ARCOM's agents no longer approve each block in advance." Quad9 called it "recklessly dangerous."

The cases: from ISPs to everyone​

The timeline shows how the circle of targets has widened:

DateWhat happened
Dec 2023Canal+ sues Cloudflare, Google and Cisco under L.333-10 to force DNS blocking of football piracy sites.
May–Jun 2024The Paris court orders the three resolvers to block ~117 domains. Google complies. Cisco pulls OpenDNS out of France on June 28, 2024, citing a court order "issued under Article L.333-10 of the French Sport code" (archived notice).
Sep–Oct 2024New orders expand blocking by Google and Cloudflare.
Dec 2024Canal+ wins three orders against Quad9 and Vercara (Premier League, Champions League, Top 14 rugby). Because it can't geolocate users, Quad9 blocks the domains for the whole world: "we have to block these sites for all users, in all areas."
May 2025A beIN request against Google, Cloudflare and Quad9 is rejected for lack of evidence. Quad9 didn't defend that case at all, citing lack of resources.
Mar 2026The Paris Court of Appeal rejects five appeals by Google, Cloudflare and Cisco (RG 24/09372), the first appellate approval of DNS blocking under L.333-10: "Any filtering measure can be circumvented, and this possibility does not render the measures in question ineffective." The same month, the court issues simultaneous orders against 19 ISPs, Google, Cloudflare, Quad9 and VPN providers.
Apr 2026Canal+ obtains orders against Whalebone's EU-funded DNS4EU resolver, which complies by blocking "globally across our resolver tiers."
May 13, 2026beIN Sports obtains an order (RG 26/02207) requiring Quad9 to block IPTV sites showing the WTA women's tennis tour until the season ends on November 14. It starts with 6 domains and grows to 58 via Arcom notifications.
Jul 202614 new Canal+ orders for the 2026/27 season target ISPs, Google, Quad9, DNS4EU, Cloudflare, VPNs, and Bing.
Oct 7, 2026The court refuses penalties against Cloudflare, NordVPN and Surfshark because each had made some effort to block. Cloudflare kept 1.1.1.1 out of it by acting through its CDN instead.
Oct 21, 2026The court imposes a €1,000/day penalty on Quad9 (RG 26/11882).
Oct 22, 2026Quad9 announces it will leave France on November 24.

The ruling itself​

The 21 October judgment is short and worth reading. A few details matter:

  • The €580,000 figure was beIN's request, not the penalty. beIN asked for €10,000 per day per domain still reachable; across 58 domains that is €580,000 a day. The judge set €1,000 a day in total, running until the end of the WTA season on November 14.
  • The judge used Quad9's malware filtering against it. Quad9 argued it could not implement geolocated blocking. The court (para. 16) replied that Quad9 "appears to contradict itself" because it already "applies automated filtering strictly limited to cybersecurity to neutralise malicious domains on a global scale." The fact that a resolver can drop a name for everyone was treated as proof it can drop a name for France.
  • Refusing to try was enough. Paragraph 18: "Bound by an obligation of means, the Quad9 foundation states that it implements none in order to execute the decision. This circumstance alone justifies the imposition of a penalty."

€1,000 a day for three weeks is survivable, about €24,000. Twenty more cases like it, each running for a full football season with ever-growing domain lists and Arcom's new automated system feeding them, is not. Quad9 says: "Quad9 cannot survive the accumulation of penalties yet to be assessed in 20 other pending cases."

Why Quad9 can't just comply​

Quad9 is often asked why it doesn't just block the domains. It has three options, and none of them work.

1. Block globally. This is what Quad9 did for Canal+ in December 2024 and what DNS4EU does today. It means a French court decides what a user in Brazil, Kenya or Germany can resolve, for the commercial benefit of one company. Quad9's announcement asks how France would react if other nations imposed their laws on French users through DNS. The answer is obvious, and the reverse should be too. Nothing limits this to sports either: once global blocking is accepted, every court in every country can add names to everyone's resolver.

2. Geo-block France. Quad9 has already tried this, in Germany. In the Sony Music v. Quad9 case, Quad9 used geoIP blocking for German users while the case continued. Sony's lawyers used a VPN to reach the content "from Germany" anyway, the court agreed this was non-compliance, and Quad9 was fined for contempt. GeoIP is a probabilistic guess about where an IP address is, not a legal fact about where a person is. A resolver that keeps no user records has no reliable way to define a "French user." As Quad9 told TorrentFreak: "There is no legally useful way for us to define a French user." Even the French order is geographically complicated: heise notes it covers the overseas departments and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon but excludes New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia.

3. Pay and fight. Quad9 won in Germany. The Dresden Higher Regional Court held in December 2023 that DNS resolvers get the same liability privilege as access providers, and the German civil rights group GFF said "the judgement puts the onus on rights holders." But winning took "several years, six figures of cost to Quad9, and massive wasted time," and the opposition, in Quad9's words, "has more lawyers than we have money and time." As Quad9 wrote in 2025, compliance costs that are routine overhead for Google are, "for small, mission-driven nonprofits like Quad9, … an existential threat."

That leaves leaving.

Why DNS blocking doesn't work​

The argument against resolver blocking isn't only about Quad9's survival. Even on its own terms, it does not do what the rightsholders want.

It doesn't remove anything. The DNS only holds pointers. Quad9's Dresden write-up puts it this way: "The DNS does not contain content - it is a system designed for delivery only of pointers." The pirate server stays online and keeps serving everyone who reaches it some other way. The Internet Society's 2025 guide for legal professionals says the same thing.

It takes seconds to bypass. Quad9 notes there are thousands of other open resolvers. Users can also run their own, or use encrypted DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484), which looks like ordinary web traffic. Arcom's own December 2025 study for the National Assembly says 20% of French internet users already use an alternative DNS resolver and 29% use a VPN. Quad9 compares DNS blocking to "holding a piece of newspaper in front of a stadium full of people to block the view of a concert."

It is blunt. DNS works at the level of whole domains. A resolver can't block one infringing stream on a shared host without blocking everything else on that name. The IAB's RFC 7754, the IETF's standard reference on blocking and filtering, says: "From a technical perspective, there are no perfect or even good solutions -- there is only least bad." ICANN's security committee revisited the question in SAC127, "DNS Blocking Revisited" (2025), warning implementers to minimise overblocking and avoid affecting users outside their jurisdiction. France's own registry operator, AFNIC, made the core point years ago in its scientific council's report on the consequences of DNS filtering: "Le DNS n'a pas été conçu pour filtrer les contenus." (The DNS was not designed to filter content.)

It is opaque. When a resolver is forced to lie, the user sees a site that doesn't load. They have no way to tell whether the site is down, their network is broken, or a court ordered the block. There is a standard for being honest about this: RFC 8914 Extended DNS Errors defines code 16, "Censored", for answers withheld "due to an external requirement imposed by an entity other than the operator." But nothing in the French orders requires resolvers to use it.

Blocking at scale causes real collateral damage. France is not the only test case. Italy's Piracy Shield system blocked Google Drive for much of the country in October 2024. A RIPE Labs study of Piracy Shield found more than 500 unrelated sites blocked and concluded that "IP-level blocking is an indiscriminate tool with consequences that outweigh its benefits." In Spain, LaLiga's IP blocking of shared Cloudflare addresses knocked innocent sites offline every match day, leading Cloudflare's CEO Matthew Prince to call the approach "bonkers". The same RIPE study found most European piracy is hosted in Europe, which is where enforcement belongs: at the hosting provider.

Measured by its own goals, the French system has a mixed record. Arcom reports 12,606 sports domains blocked since 2022, 6,496 of them in 2025 alone (up 71%), while piracy fell 4% in 2025 and 34% since 2021. The number of blocks is growing much faster than piracy is shrinking, and Arcom's figures don't separate the effect of resolver blocking from ISP blocking. Every one of those domains has to be found, blocked, and then found again when it reappears under a new name. OONI's 2025 measurement of French ISP blocking found that of 542 domains tested, 291 were blocked by at least one ISP but only 132 by all four. The European Commission's own 2025 assessment of its live-events piracy recommendation concluded the effects "have been limited and have not allowed to significantly curb the volume of online piracy of live events."

What France loses​

Driving Quad9 out of France doesn't hurt pirates at all. The people who lose are the ones who chose a resolver for security.

  • French users lose a malware filter. Quad9 exists to stop people resolving phishing and malware domains. Users who move to an unfiltered resolver, or to their ISP's resolver, lose that protection. Users who move to an unknown free resolver may be trading it for one that sells their browsing data. As Cloudflare puts it, "Penalizing transparent services only pushes users toward less accountable corners of the web."
  • Critical infrastructure may break silently. Hospitals, utilities and local authorities on Quad9's list will lose DNS if their IT teams miss the announcement. Embedded devices with 9.9.9.9 hard-coded may be hard to fix.
  • The choice of resolvers shrinks. OpenDNS left France in 2024, and Quad9 leaves now. An Internet Society report cited by TorrentFreak warned that small and non-profit resolvers are the most likely to be pushed out, leaving the field to the largest companies, which can afford to fight or to build per-country infrastructure. Cloudflare can satisfy the court by blocking at its CDN; Quad9 has only a resolver.
  • France's own digital sovereignty goals suffer. France promotes privacy-respecting European infrastructure, yet its courts are driving out a Swiss privacy-focused non-profit while US giants remain.

It's not just France​

Quad9 is the clearest casualty so far, but the same process is underway across Europe.

  • Belgium: DAZN obtained an order against Cloudflare, Google and Cisco in March 2025, and OpenDNS left Belgium in April 2025 before returning when the order against Cisco was suspended. In August 2026, the Brussels business court upheld the core of the order, with fines of €100,000 per match day capped at €20 million per company. Cisco says its public DNS "does not allow for the implementation of selective, geolocated and dynamic blocking as required by the order." Cloudflare, Google and Cisco have appealed ahead of the January 2027 deadline.
  • Italy: AGCOM fined Cloudflare €14.2 million in January 2026, 1% of its global revenue, for not blocking via 1.1.1.1. Prince threatened to pull servers and free services from Italy: "Play stupid games, win stupid prizes."
  • Spain: A Barcelona court upheld LaLiga's right to block Cloudflare IP addresses.
  • Germany is the counter-example. Courts there rejected resolver blocking for both Quad9 and Cloudflare.
  • The EU level: A study commissioned by the European Parliament's legal affairs committee proposes a binding regulation that would require blocking within 30 minutes across DNS resolvers, VPNs and CDNs. John Todd's warning on Hacker News is that "the EU and EC are looking at this issue right now and I expect will look to France as a case study of how to do things for the rest of the region."

That is why France matters beyond France. If its model becomes the EU template, every public resolver in Europe will face the choice Quad9 faced: lie to all users worldwide, build unreliable geolocation infrastructure, or leave.

The counter-arguments​

The Hacker News discussion wasn't one-sided, and the counter-arguments deserve answers.

"Hosting providers are unreachable, so courts move up the chain." One commenter argued that pirate hosts are bulletproof and ignore courts, so going after the intermediaries is the only lever left. Another asked the Quad9 CTO directly where the problem should be attacked. This is the strongest point. But the RIPE data shows most of the hosting is in Europe and within reach of European courts, and the commenter's logic leads to blocking at the last link in the chain that cannot fight back. That is not the same as the link that can actually stop the infringement.

"Friction works. Most people won't bother to switch." Some argued that DNS blocking is good because it nudges the majority while staying easy to bypass for those who know how. The Paris Court of Appeal used essentially this reasoning. But Arcom's numbers say a fifth of French users already use alternative DNS, the friction is gone the moment one person changes a router setting for a household, and the cost is paid by resolvers that never had anything to do with piracy.

"Cloudflare is a hypocrite." Several commenters pointed out that Cloudflare's CDN fronts many pirate sites. That may be true, and it is an argument about Cloudflare's CDN, which French courts can already reach and have. It says nothing about whether a resolver should lie.

"The yellow pages would be held responsible." One commenter asked whether we'd accept a phone directory that kept listing a drug dealer's new address. The analogy fails because a resolver is not a curated directory. It's closer to the operator who connects you to whatever number you dial. Quad9 has "no association with these domain names, nor with the operators of the websites." Making the operator liable for every number dialled is how you end up with no operator.

What you can do​

If you use Quad9 in France, check whether you do at on.quad9.net, and switch resolvers before November 24. Check routers, VPN configs, DHCP settings, Pi-hole upstreams, and any devices with 9.9.9.9 or 149.112.112.112 hard-coded. Whatever you switch to, read its privacy policy first.

If you're in France or the EU, do what John Todd asked: write something long-form, ideally in French, make it indexable, and send it to your representatives. Quad9 specifically suggests telling Arcom that its mandate is to balance rightsholders' interests against citizens' digital rights, and that "balance cannot be claimed when the privacy and security of digital users are the collateral damage."

If you work on infrastructure, push for transparency wherever blocking does happen. RFC 8914's "Censored" error code exists so users can tell a court-ordered block from a broken network.

If you can afford it, Quad9 accepts donations for its legal defence. Its appeal against the May order is still pending at the Paris Court of Appeal.

The canary​

Quad9 put it this way: "Once the tools of censorship are built, they are rarely used sparingly or justly." The French system started with football. It now covers tennis, rugby, MotoGP and Formula 1, has expanded from ISPs to resolvers, VPNs, CDNs and search engines, and runs through an automated system in which no human approves each block. Each step was reasonable on its own. Together, they have pushed a non-profit security service out of the country while the piracy continues.

The sports-rights industry has a real problem. DNS resolvers are the wrong place to solve it, and France is about to find out what the internet looks like when the trustworthy resolvers leave first.

About the author

AS
Al SmithTechnical writer

Al Smith is a software engineer and technical writer for Ritza and contributor to TechStackups.com